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From domain-specific to domain-general?  
The developmental path of metacognition for strategy selection 
Metacognition, typically defined as the ability to evaluate (or monitor) and regulate (or 
control) the success of cognitive processes (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009), has been regarded as a 
fundamental skill influencing cognitive performance and learning in domains as diverse as arithmetic, 
memory, reading, perception, and many others (Kuhn, 2000). Generally, metacognition is viewed as a 
global ability that is correlated across content domains, suggesting that participants who are good at 
evaluating their performance for one sort of task also tend to be good at evaluating their 
performance for another sort of task (Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995). 
Domain-General or Domain-Specific Metacognition Processes? 
In adults, the assumption that metacognition is domain-general is supported by two types of 
evidence. First, a number of behavioral studies seem to indicate that inter-individual differences in 
measures of metacognitive sensitivity (i.e., how well one can discriminate between correct and 
incorrect responses through the monitoring of one’s own performance) correlated across unrelated 
cognitive tasks (e.g., Gardelle & Mamassion, 2014; McCurdy et al., 2013; Schraw et al., 1995; Song et 
al., 2011; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997; Veenman, Prins, & Verheij, 2003). Second, imaging data 
suggest that adults’ metacognitive abilities for different types of tasks partially depend on common 
neural structures (Allen et al., 2016; Anderson, Betts, Ferris, & Fincham, 2011; McCurdy et al., 2013; 
Shimamura, 2000). These results, however, have to be qualified to some extent. Indeed, behavioral 
correlations observed across domains have been shown to depend on the type of metacognitive 
measures used as well as on whether the performance at the cognitive level is controlled (e.g., 
Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000). Furthermore, some imaging studies have failed to find common 
neural structures when examining adults’ metacognitive abilities across domains (e.g., Baird, 
Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies, 2013). 
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In children, the situation is even less clear. Indeed, most experiments testing metacognition 
in children have been conducted in a single cognitive domain at a time (see Schneider & Löffler, 
2016, for an overview). Only a limited number of studies have examined the developmental trend of 
metacognitive skills concurrently across several domains. The few available data sets suggest that 
metacognition (understood here as metacognitive sensitivity or monitoring) could be domain-specific 
early in development and generalize across domains as children mature (Lyons & Ghetti, 2010; 
Schraw & Nietfeld, 1998; Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Vo, Li, Kornell, Pouget, & Cantlon, 2014). For 
example, Vo et al. (2014) have shown that 5- to 8-year-olds’ metacognition for a numerical 
discrimination task was unrelated to their metacognition for an emotion discrimination task. 
Moreover, Veenman and Spaans (2005) found that metacognition correlates between domains at 
age 15. These results suggest that a shift from a domain-specific to a domain-general metacognition 
could occur between these ages. To date, however, this hypothesis has never been directly tested. 
Determining the developmental trajectory of whether and how metacognition generalizes 
across domains could be crucial in at least two respects. From a theoretical perspective, this would 
shed new light on how metacognition develops throughout childhood while helping us to improve 
our understanding of both the functioning and the cognitive architecture of metacognitive processes. 
From a practical perspective, determining when metacognition becomes domain-general and 
thereby the conditions for such a generalization could have a major impact on metacognitive 
revalidation programs. Indeed, if metacognition does not depend on domains, it implies that 
metacognitive interventions in one domain (e.g., arithmetic, memory, or reading) could have positive 
effects across all domains. For these reasons, the first aim of the present study was to examine age-
related differences in the relations between measures of metacognitive sensitivity for two different 
cognitive tasks in children aged from 8 to 13 years. Specifically, participants were asked to evaluate 




Metacognition and Strategy Selection 
Several decades of research in children (see Siegler, 1996, 2007, for overviews) and during 
adulthood (see Lemaire, 2016, for an overview) have shown that people use a variety of strategies to 
accomplish cognitive tasks. This plethora of studies indicates that participants’ performance and age-
related changes in cognitive performance depend on strategies. Yet, despite extensive research 
seeking to understand how people choose among strategies on a given item (e.g., Metcalfe, & 
Campbell, 2011; Thevenot, Fanget, & Fayol, 2007), participants’ ability to monitor their chance of 
selecting the better strategy in the future (i.e., prospective judgment) or to estimate their level of 
confidence associated with a selected strategy (i.e., retrospective judgment) has been examined 
neither in the arithmetic domain nor in the memory domain. As four decades of studies – mainly in 
the memory domain – have established that the influence of metacognitive processes on cognitive 
performance is exerted through the implementation of effective strategies (e.g., DeMarie, Miller, 
Ferron, & Cunningham, 2004; Geurten, Lejeune, & Meulemans, 2016; Nelson & Narens, 1990; see 
Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009 for an overview), it is surprising that so little has been done to investigate 
how accurate participants are in estimating whether they selected (or will select) the most effective 
strategy on a given item. Some data suggest that both adults and children can use better strategy 
judgments to change strategy while executing an already-selected strategy (e.g., Ardiale & Lemaire, 
2012; Ardiale & Lemaire, 2013; Siegler & Crowley, 1994). For example, Ardiale and Lemaire asked 
children and adults to execute pre-selected arithmetic strategies on arithmetic problems. After 
participants started to execute cued strategy for 1 sec. (too short to fully complete strategy 
execution), they were asked to judge whether the cued strategy was the better or poorer strategy for 
that problem. They were also given the possibility to switch strategy in case they judge the cued 
strategy to be the poorer strategy. Data showed that children provided better strategy judgments 
and switched more and more often as they grew older. Note however that one important limitation 
of Ardiale and Lemaire’s work is that children’s better strategy judgments were not based on 
children’s strategy selection but on strategies selected by the experimenter. Unknown is how 
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children monitor their chances of selecting the better strategy on each item and how such strategy 
monitoring changes with age.  
In the arithmetic field, some theoretical assumptions made by computational models of 
strategy selection are consistent with the hypothesis that being able to introspect on how easy it 
would be to select the better strategy or on the level of uncertainty associated with the selected 
strategy increases the likelihood to be better at choosing the best strategy on each item. Generally, 
computational models propose that choosing among multiple strategies crucially involves associative 
mechanisms such as activating the relative costs/benefits of each strategy and selecting the strategy 
that works best for a given problem on the basis of problem and strategy characteristics (e.g., Lovett 
& Anderson, 1996; Siegler & Shipley, 1995; Lovett & Schunn, 1999; Neches, 1987; Rieskamp & Otto, 
2006; Siegler & Araya, 2005). In addition to associative mechanisms, two of the existing 
computational models assume that strategy choices involve metacognitive mechanisms. Specifically, 
in the Lovett and Schunn’s (1999) Represent, Construct, Choose, Learn model (RCCL), the 
metacognitive system enables participants to interrupt a strategy mid-execution if they estimate that 
the current strategy is not the best one or if it is inappropriate. In Siegler and Araya’s (2005) Strategy, 
Choice, and Discovery Simulation* (SCADS*), the metacognitive system is crucial to create or 
discover new strategies. In sum, models of strategies include metacognitive processes to evaluate 
the strategies once selected and, possibly to interrupt strategies mid-execution to switch for a better 
strategy (RCCL) or to create and discover new legitimate strategies (SCADS). 
In this context, the second aim of the present study was to examine metacognitive sensitivity 
for strategy selection at different ages in two unrelated cognitive domains. Our goal was to 
investigate whether children are able to make accurate metacognitive judgments on strategy 
selection and whether there are age-related changes in metacognitive sensitivity for both the 
arithmetic and the memory tasks. If observed, this pattern would indicate that metacognition for 
strategy selection improves with age, providing a necessary prerequisite for the hypothesis that 
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metacognition accounts for age-related differences in children’s strategy selection in both the 
arithmetic (e.g., Lemaire & Callies, 2009; Lemaire & Lecacheur, 2011) and the memory fields (e.g., 
Ghatala, 1986; Son, 2005). 
Overview of the Present Study 
The primary goals of this study were to document the developmental course of domain-
generality/-specificity of metacognition by examining the ability of children to monitor the accuracy 
of their strategy selection in both the arithmetic and the memory domains. To test domain-general 
versus domain-specific metacognition processes during strategy selection, three experiments were 
conducted. In each experiment, three groups of children aged of 8-9, 10-11, and 12-13 years were 
recruited. These age groups were selected because previous studies on metacognition have 
suggested that a shifting from domain-specific to domain-general metacognition could occur 
between 8 and 15 years of age (Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Vo et al., 2014). Furthermore, important 
changes also occur in how children select and execute strategies between those ages (see Siegler 
1996, 2007, for overviews). In all previous studies exploring the hypothesis of domain-general 
mechanisms, metacognition was assessed by asking participants to evaluate their own cognitive 
performance. No research focused on how accurate participants were to judge the success of their 
strategy selection. Yet, monitoring the accuracy of strategy selection in different domains could 
possibly involve more global metacognitive skills than monitoring cognitive performance. Using 
strategy selection tasks could thus increase the chances of showing a trend toward generalization of 
metacognitive processes, if such trend exists. 
For these reasons, we asked all children to accomplish two better strategy selection tasks. In 
the arithmetic task, participants were given arithmetic problems (e.g., 47+32) and had to select the 
better strategy to solve each of them among two available strategies, namely, a rounding-down 
strategy (doing 40+30=70) or a rounding-up strategy (doing 50+40=90). In the memory task, 
participants were given triads of words (e.g., Bat – Cat – Hat) and had to select the better strategy to 
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remember triads among two available strategies, namely, a phonological strategy (words ending = 
“AT”) or a semantic strategy (e.g., “Animal”). Asking participants to select among a set of strategies 
enabled to control for individual differences in strategy repertoire (e.g., some children know and use 
more strategies than others). Also, previous works have shown that when children are left free to 
choose whichever strategies they want to accomplish these tasks, they do use the above mentioned 
strategies spontaneously (e.g., Bjorklund, Dukes, & Brown, 2009; LeFevre, Greenham, & Waheed, 
1993; Lemaire, Lecacheur, & Farioli, 2000). Designs controlling the number of available strategies to 
choose among do not yield different findings regarding age-related changes in rates of better 
strategy selection and in strategy performance.  
In Experiment 1, metacognition was assessed using Ease of Selection judgments (EoS). 
Specifically, in both the arithmetic and the memory tasks, children were asked to judge on a trial-by-
trial basis the ease with which they would select the better strategy (i.e., prospective judgments). In 
Experiments 2 and 3, metacognition was assessed using Retrospective Confidence Judgments (RCJ). 
For each task, children were asked to estimate on a trial-by-trial basis the level of confidence 
associated with their responses (i.e., retrospective judgments). This procedure was used because 
several studies have shown that some aspects of prospective metacognitive judgments (i.e., 
prediction of future performance) differ from retrospective metacognitive judgments (i.e., estimation 
of the accuracy of past responses) (Kelemen et al., 2000; Siedlecka, Paulewicz, & Wierzchoń, 2016). 
For instance, Kelemen et al. (2000) showed no significant correlations between these different types 
of judgments within the same domain in adults while several studies in children have revealed 
differences in their developmental trajectories (see Schneider & Lockl, 2008, for an overview). Also, 
neuropsychological dissociations have previously been found between prospective and retrospective 
judgments in adults with acquired brain injury (e.g., Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005), suggesting that these 




To measure metacognitive sensitivity, different approaches are available. From a statistical 
perspective, each of them has unique strengths and weaknesses (for a detailed description of the 
characteristics of these metacognitive metrics, see Fleming & Lau, 2014). To provide a reliable picture 
of children’s metacognitive abilities, we computed three measures of metacognition for each 
strategy selection tasks: φ, γ, and A’ROC. The φ and γ coefficients are popular measures of 
metacognitive sensitivity and provide a common scale to compare our results to those of previous 
studies examining the domain-generality of metacognition. However, these two measures may be 
influenced by the tendency to use higher or lower confidence ratings (bias). The A’ROC index provides 
a bias-free measure of metacognition (Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003). 
We predicted that metacognitive sensitivity should be higher than chance for both the 
arithmetic and the memory tasks, indicating that children can introspect on their strategy choices. 
Furthermore, we also expected that metacognition for strategy selection should increase with age. 
Regarding the hypothesis of a developmental trend in metacognition across domains, several 
scenarios are possible. First, metacognition is domain-specific in childhood and remains that way 
through adulthood. In this case, no covariations should be found between metacognitive measures 
for the two strategy selection tasks. However, given the amount of data indicating that 
metacognition correlates across domains in adulthood, this hypothesis is quite unlikely. Second, 
there is an embryonic domain-general metacognition in children that increases with age. In this case, 
significant relations should be found between metacognitive measures in all children, and these 
relations should be larger in older children. Third, metacognition shifts from domain-specific to 
domain-general. In this case, we expected no significant covariations between metacognitive 
measures for the two strategy selection tasks in younger children, but significant relations in older 
participants. This pattern would provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that metacognition 




The aim of Experiment 1 was to examine the possible transition from domain-specific to 
domain-general metacognitive processes during childhood using a common prospective 
metacognitive task. Specifically, participants were instructed to estimate the ease with which they 
would select the better strategy on a given item before actually selecting it. This type of judgment is 
commonly used to assess people’s ability to monitor their cognitive processes (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 
2009) and is generally shown to be sensitive to developmental changes in children’s metacognitive 
skills (see Schneider & Lockl, 2008). 
Method 
Participants. The final sample included 60 typically developing children aged 8-9 (grade 5; 
n = 20; 10 females; mean age = 9.1 years; SD = 0.59), 10-11 (grade 6; n = 20; 10 females; mean 
age = 10.9 years; SD = 0.47), and 12-13 (grade 7; n = 20; 10 females; mean age = 12.6 years; 
SD = 0.55) years. The native language of all children was French, and all children were from a middle- 
to upper-class socioeconomic status. Three additional participants were tested but excluded from 
the final analyses because they used the same strategy on all items in the arithmetic task. No group 
differences were found regarding parental education and non-verbal intelligence (Fs<1.5, 
respectively assessed using both parents’ years of education and scores on the Matrix Reasoning 
test; Wechsler, 2004). The sample was recruited from elementary and middle schools in Belgium. 
Data collection stopped when the number of participants was sufficient to reach a predicted power 
of .80 for a within-between interaction (medium effect size). 
Stimuli. The stimuli for the arithmetic task were 40 two-digit addition problems (e.g., 32 + 
47). Based on previous findings in arithmetic (see Kadosh & Dowker, 2015, for an overview), the 
following factors were controlled: (a) no operand had a 0 or a 5 unit digit, (b) digits were not 
repeated within operands (e.g., 33 + 42), (c) digits were not repeated in the same unit or decade 
positions across operands (e.g., 62 + 67), (d) no reverse order of operands was used (e.g., 56 + 23 vs. 
23 + 56), (e) the first operand was larger than the second operand in half the problems, and (f) the 
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operand with the smallest unit digits was in the left position in half the problems (e.g., 42 + 36) and 
in the right position in the other problems (e.g., 23 + 41). Moreover, to avoid ceiling effects and make 
the selection task more difficult, all problems had the unit digit of one operand smaller than 5 while 
that of the other operand was larger than 5 (e.g., 32 + 49). Mean correct sums were 67.1 (range = 
42–82). Half the problems (N = 20) were so-called rounding-down problems because they were best 
estimated (i.e., closest sums from the correct sums) with the rounding-down strategy (e.g., 56 + 21) 
and half rounding-up problems because they were best estimated with the rounding-up strategy 
(e.g., 24 + 39). Mean correct sums were 66.2 (range = 42–79) for rounding-down problems and 65.8 
(range = 42–82) for rounding-up problems. The 40 problems were grouped into 20 pairs. Each pair 
was followed by a countdown task (i.e., counting backward from a particular number by 3). Half of 
the pairs were composed of the same type of problems (e.g., a rounding-down problem followed by 
a rounding-down problem) while the other half included different types of problems (e.g., a 
rounding-down problem followed by a rounding-up problem). This method was used because 
previous data showed strategy switch costs (Lemaire & Brun, 2016) that decreased with children’s 
age. We thus wanted to control the influence of switching from one type of problems to the other on 
children’s strategy selection and metacognitive sensitivity. 
The stimuli for the memory task were 40 triads of French words (e.g., Dog – Frog – Bee). All 
words were selected to be included in the vocabulary of 8 year olds (Lachaud, 2007). Half the triads 
(N = 20) were so-called phonological triads because they were composed of words that were 
phonologically related (e.g., Bat – Cat – Hat) and, thus, were more likely to be remembered with the 
help of a phonological cue (e.g., “word ending = AT”). The other triads were so-called semantic triads 
because they were composed of words that were semantically related (e.g., Dog – Frog – Bee) and, 
thus, were more likely to be remembered with the help of a semantic cue (e.g., “animal”). The words 
composing these two types of triads were matched on frequency (6.14 vs. 6.05 occurrences per 
million words; Radeau, Mousty, & Content, 1990), number of syllables (means of 1.65 vs. 1.68 
syllables), and concreteness (values of 6.28 vs. 6.44; Desrochers & Bergeron, 2000). Moreover, each 
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triad included two words that were both phonologically and semantically related (e.g., Cat – Bat or 
Dog - Frog) in such a way that the better strategy had to be determined on the basis of the third 
word (e.g., Hat or Bee), which was either phonologically or semantically related to the other two 
words. The position of that words within triads was counterbalanced across triads. This method was 
employed to avoid ceiling effects and to make the selection task more difficult. Finally, the 40 triads 
were grouped into 20 pairs. Each pair was followed by a countdown task. Half of the pairs were 
composed of the same type of triads (e.g., a phonological triad followed by a phonological triad) 
while the other half including different types of problems (e.g., a phonological triad followed by a 
semantic triad). 
Procedure. Institutional Review Board approval was obtained from the local ethics 
committee before data collection began (protocol number: 1617-01). Written consent was obtained 
from children’s parents before the study. Children were individually tested in a quiet room in their 
school using a laptop computer equipped with Toolbook 11.5 software. They underwent a 60-minute 
session including an arithmetic and a memory tasks which were separated from each other by a 2-
minute break. Half the children completed the arithmetic task first, and the other children did the 
memory task first. 
Following previous studies testing children’s computational estimation skills (e.g., Lemaire & 
Brun, 2014, 2016), in the arithmetic task, children were asked to give an approximate answer to each 
arithmetic problem that is as close as possible to the correct answer without actually calculating the 
correct answer. To this end, they were instructed to select between rounding both operands down 
(rounding-down strategy) and rounding both operands up (rounding-up strategy) on each problem. 
The two strategies were illustrated with a couple of examples. The better strategy for a given 
problem was the strategy that yielded the answer that was closest to the correct product for this 
problem. Instructions emphasized that participants should not use the mixed-rounding strategy (i.e., 
rounding one operand down and the other up to the closest decades) and should do nothing more 
than the initial rounding down or up (i.e., adding or subtracting small amounts after calculating the 
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sum of rounded operands). All participants were presented the 20 pairs of problems in random 
order. 
In the memory task, stimuli were presented triad-by-triad. Following previous studies 
examining children’s associative memory skills (Geurten, Willems, & Meulemans, 2015), children 
were asked to remember as many triads as possible in order to recall them when the first word of 
each triad would be presented later. To this end, they had to select between generating a 
phonological cue (phonological strategy) or a semantic cue (semantic strategy). The strategies were 
illustrated using a couple of examples. The better strategy for a given triad was the strategy that 
helped children to link the three words of the triad together. Instructions emphasized the fact that 
participants should not use any other strategy than the two available strategies and should do 
nothing more than generating the cue (i.e., using another memory strategy). All participants were 
presented with the 20 pairs of triads in random order. 
Each stimulus of the two tasks went through three successive phases: (a) a judgment phase, 
(b) a selection phase, and (c) an execution phase (for an illustration of the experimental procedure, 
see Figure 1). For each task (arithmetic and memory), the test was preceded by four practice trials so 
that children could get familiarized with the apparatus and the general procedure used in each 
phase. At the end of the four practice trials, all children seemed to have understood what the task 
required of them. The stimuli were presented in 54-point Calibri black font in the center of the 
computer screen. Each trial was preceded by a blank screen for 250 ms that was followed by a 
warning signal (“+”) displayed for 500 ms. 
< Figure 1 > 
Judgment phase. The first step of each task was an EoS (Ease of better strategy selection) 
judgment. The stimuli were presented one by one in the center of the screen for 3 s each. After each 
stimulus display, children were instructed to indicate how easy it would be to select the better 
strategy (between the two available strategies) to estimate the correct sums of each problem 
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(arithmetic task) or to increase the likelihood of remembering each triad (memory task). A 
thermometer procedure based on the hot/cold game (Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert, 2002) was used to 
enable children to understand the meaning of EoS. Specifically, a colored horizontal thermometer 
appeared on the computer screen with a cursor positioned in the middle. Children were asked to give 
their ratings by moving the cursor anywhere from the deep blue (very cold) end to the deep red (very 
hot) end of the scale according to their level of estimated difficulty. The position of the cursor on the 
thermometer was transformed into an EoS percentage score (0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100%). 
Specifically, the thermometer was divided into six bins. Positioning the cursor within a band 
translated into a specific judgment value. 
Selection phase. For each item, the judgment phase was immediately followed by a strategy 
selection phase. The stimuli were presented together with two response buttons for an unlimited 
time. Each response button corresponded to one of the two available strategies (i.e., rounding-
down/rounding-up or phonological/semantic). Children were required to choose which of the two 
strategies was the better strategy to complete the task by pressing one of the two buttons. We 
recorded the number of better strategy selections and mean selection times for each task. Selection 
times that were more than three standard divisions from the mean were excluded.  
Execution phase. On each item, once the strategy was selected, participants were asked to 
execute it out loud. In the arithmetic task, they rounded both operands up or down before adding 
the rounded operands (e.g., “24 + 42 = 20 + 40”). A correct execution was coded 1, and an incorrect 
execution was coded 0. In the memory task, participants generated the cue out loud (e.g., “animal”). 
The generation of a correct cue was coded 1, and the generation of an incorrect cue was coded 0. 
The experimenter pressed a response key immediately after the participant’s response (i.e., the up 
key was pressed if the strategy was executed correctly. The down key was pressed otherwise). We 
collected the number of strategies correctly executed and mean execution times for each task. 
Execution times that were more than three standard deviations from the mean were excluded. In the 
arithmetic task, children moved on to the next problem directly after executing the strategy. In the 
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memory task, children were asked to recall the last two words of each triad in response to the 
presentation of the first word (e.g., “Dog - ? - ?”) before moving on to the next triad. This procedure 
was used because we wanted to keep children motivated to generate cues that would help them to 
retrieve the items. All participants recalled all triads. No feedback was given to children following 
their responses in order not to interfere with participants’ ability to internally monitor their own 
performance by providing external information (Geurten & Meulemans, 2016). 
Results 
First, we examined age-related differences in strategy selection and execution for the 
arithmetic and memory tasks. Then, we tested children’s metacognitive sensitivity (i.e., the accuracy 
of EoS judgments). Finally, we tested the domain-generality versus domain-specificity of 
metacognition. Unless otherwise noted, differences were significant to at least p<.05 in Experiments 
1, 2, and 3. Preliminary analyses indicated that no gender or order effects were significant on any of 
the dependent variables. Similarly, we did not find any effects of the type of pairs on children’s 
performance. Finally, we conducted a Grubb’s test to check for possible outliers. No outliers were 
found for any of our dependent variables, all ps >.05. 
Age-related changes in strategic variations. Mean rates of better strategy selection and 
mean selection latencies for the arithmetic and memory tasks were analyzed to test age-related and 
task-related differences in strategy selection. Mean execution times were analyzed to test strategy 
execution. We did not conduct analyses on the mean rates of better strategy execution because 
most children made no execution errors. Rates of better strategy selection, mean selection latencies, 
and mean strategy execution times were analyzed with mixed-design ANOVAs, 3 (Age: 8-9, 10-11, 12-
13 year olds) x 2 (Task: arithmetic, memory), with age as the only between-participants factor (see 
means in Table 1).  
< Table 1 > 
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Better strategy selection rates. Rates of better strategy selection increased with children’s 
age, F(2,57) = 4.12, MSe = 1.15, η²p = .13. Planned comparisons showed that 8-9 year olds (.78) 
selected the better strategy less often than 10-11 year olds (.86), F(1,57) = 6.11, MSe = 0.79, η²p = 
.13, and 12-13 year olds (.86), F(1,57) = 6.15, MSe = 0.79, η²p = .14. All children also selected the 
better strategy more often in the memory task (.93) than in the arithmetic task (.74), F(1,57) = 69.16, 
MSe = 0.79, η²p = .56. An Age x Task interaction came out significant, F(2,57) = 4.30, MSe = 0.79, η²p = 
.14, indicating that 8-9 year olds (.64) had lower rates of better strategy selection than 10-11 year 
olds (.79), F(1,57) = 6.51, MSe = 1.81, η²p = .13, and 12-13 year olds (.80), F(1,57) = 6.77, MSe = 1.81, 
η²p = .16, in the arithmetic task. No age effects (Fs<1) were found in the memory task. 
Better strategy selection latencies. Children were faster at selecting the better strategy as 
they grow older, F(2,57) = 3.04, MSe = 505399200, p = .056, η²p = .10. Planned comparisons revealed 
that 8-9 year olds (5978 ms) were slower than 12-13 year olds (4270 ms) to select the better 
strategy, F(1,57) = 6.01, MSe = 413844500, η²p = .12. No other effects involving the age factor were 
found, Fs<2.29. Children were faster to select the better strategy on memory triads (4442 ms) than 
on arithmetic problems (5938 ms), F(1,57) = 10.88, MSe = 326832900, η²p = .17. The Age x Task 
interaction was not significant, F<1. 
Better strategy execution times. Children were faster to execute the better strategy in the 
memory task (5827 ms) than in the arithmetic task (6698 ms), F(1,57) = 7.43, MSe = 161981800, η²p = 
.12. No other main or interaction effects reached significance, all Fs<1.54. 
Relations between domains. To examine whether performance for the arithmetic task was 
related to performance for the memory task, we tested whether better strategy selection rates or 
better strategy selection latencies correlated between the two tasks in each age group. No 
correlations were significant, all rs<.26, all ps>.29. This means that a child who was good at selecting 
the better strategy in one domain did not necessarily select the better strategy in the other domain. 
It also means that a child who was fast at selecting the better strategy in one domain was not 
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necessarily fast at doing it in the other domain. More generally, these suggest domain specificity of 
strategy selection and strategy execution.  
In sum, these results showed that older children selected the better strategy more often than 
younger children, but that these age-related differences were significant only in the arithmetic task. 
All children were also faster to select and execute the better strategy in the memory task than in the 
arithmetic task. Moreover, measures of rates of and latencies for better strategy selection did not 
correlate between tasks. This is probably because children’s strategy selection accuracy had already 
reached a peak for the memory task, but still showed improvements for the arithmetic task, 
suggesting domain-specific strategy selection processed. This hypothesis is strengthened by the lack 
of covariations between strategy selection times across domains.  
Age-related changes in metacognitive processes. We calculated three measures of 
metacognitive sensitivity for both the arithmetic and the memory tasks: φ, γ, and A’ROC. The φ 
coefficient represents the correlation between selection accuracy (better or poorer strategy selection 
was the objective measure of performance) and metacognitive judgments (Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 
2007). The γ coefficient is a non-parametric correlation coefficient that is calculated by taking the 
difference between concordances (e.g., a high judgment on better strategy selection) and 
discordances (e.g., a high judgment on poorer strategy selection) and measuring the strength of the 
association between these cross tabulated data (Nelson, 1984). The A’ROC is a non-parametric 
measure from signal detection theory which plots the concordances against the discordances 
(Kornbrot, 2006). Relative to φ and γ coefficients, A’ROC has the theoretical advantage of being 
uninfluenced by the overall bias of a participant to rate his or her confidence as high or low. An φ and 
a γ coefficients of zero or an A’ROC of 0.5 indicate no metacognitive discrimination between better or 
poorer strategy selections. Interestingly, because these three indexes are non-parametric, they do 
not depend on strong assumptions about the nature of the underlying distributions. Consequently, 
they can be computed even when data are not normally distributed (e.g., Fleming et al., 2014). 
16 
 
We first examined whether children were able to make above chance EoS judgments for the 
two strategy selection tasks. Results of the t tests showed that the three metacognitive coefficients 
were significantly larger than chance in both the arithmetic and the memory tasks for all age groups 
(see Table 2). 
< Table 2 > 
Next, we tested effects of age and task on φ, γ, and A’ROC. These three metacognitive 
coefficients were analyzed with mixed-design ANOVAs, 3 (Age: 8-9-, 10-11, 12-13 year olds) x 2 (Task: 
arithmetic, memory), with age as the between-participants factor. Metacognitive sensitivity in both 
the arithmetic and memory tasks increased with age when assessed with the φ coefficient, F(2,57) = 
7.46, MSe = 2.62, η²
p
 = .21, the γ coefficient, F(2,57) = 6.12, MSe = 16.83, η²
p
 = .18, and the A’ROC 
index, F(2,57) = 5.82, MSe = 0.46, η²
p
 = .17. Specifically, results of pairwise comparisons consistently 
showed that 8-9 year olds had lower metacognitive accuracy than 10-11 year olds and 12-13 year 
olds, and that 10-11 year olds had lower metacognitive accuracy than 12-13 year olds, all Fs>5.25. No 
main effects of task and no Age x Task interactions were found, all Fs<2.85. 
Domain-specificity/-generality of metacognition. To determine whether metacognitive 
monitoring for strategy selection is domain-general or domain-specific, we first examined relations 
between metacognitive measures across the arithmetic and memory domains in each age group. 
Correlational plots for each age group and each metacognitive measure are presented in the 
Appendix (Figure A1). None of the three metacognitive values significantly correlated across domains 
in 8-9 year olds, all rφ = .17, p = .47, rγ = .10, p = .68, rROC = .14, p = .56. However, a medium correlation 
was found between φ coefficients in 10-11 year olds, r = .48, p =.03, and a large correlation was 
found in 12-13 year olds, r = .67, p = .01. Similarly, the A’ROC indexes for both the arithmetic and 
memory tasks correlated in 10-11 year olds, r = .55, p =.01, and in 12-13 year olds, r = .83, p<.001. No 
significant correlations were found between γ coefficients, rs<.27, ps>.25. However, the lack of 
correlations between γ should be interpreted with caution because of systematic biases in this 
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measure (Masson & Rotello, 2009). We tested differences between these correlations with R-to-Z 
Fisher tests. Correlations between φ coefficients were larger in 12-13 year olds than in 8-9 year olds 
(rs = .17 vs. .67, p = .03). Correlations between A’ROC indexes were larger in 12-13 year olds than in 8-
9 year olds (rs = .18 vs. .83, p = .002) and in 10-11 year olds (rs = .55 vs. .83, p = .05). No other 
differences were found, ps>.08. 
When examined separately, the three metacognitive measures broadly indicated age-related 
changes in relations between judgments across domains. To examine whether this pattern held 
when all measures are considered conjointly, we conducted canonical correlation analyses for each 
age group to find the maximal correlation between the linear combination of the three 
metacognitive scores computed for each task (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).  Results 
showed no significant relations at age 8-9, r = .61, χ²(9) = 8.22, p = .51. However, the two sets of 
metacognitive indexes tended to correlate at age 10-11, r = .72, χ²(9) = 15.54, p = .08, and 
significantly correlated at age 12-13, r = .86, χ²(9) = 23.74, p = .004.  
To rule out the possibility that our results were due to the fact that older children make more 
similar absolute judgments across tasks as compared to young children, we conducted Pearson’s 
correlation analyses between EoS judgments reported for the arithmetic and memory tasks in each 
age group. Results revealed that EoS judgments for both tasks significantly correlated at all ages, r = 
.69, p < .001 at age 8-9, r = .75, p < .001 at age 10-11, and r = .60, p < .001 at age 12-13. Moreover, 
we tested differences between these correlations with R-to-Z Fisher tests. No significant differences 
were found, all ps > .24. This pattern suggests that the developmental changes observed across 
domains for the metacognitive indexes were probably not due to age-related differences in children’s 
response bias scores, but to differences in the ability of participants to discriminate between better 
or poorer strategy selections. 
Nevertheless, significant correlations between metacognitive scores for the arithmetic and 
memory tasks are not sufficient to conclude that metacognitive scores cluster together 
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independently of domain. To test this more strongly, we used an Exploratory Factorial Analysis (EFA) 
across the three measures of metacognitive sensitivity for the two strategy selection tasks and for 
each age group. Six variables were included in these analyses. Two factors accounting for 46% and 
45% of the variance emerged with an eigenvalue exceeding 1 (Kaiser’s criterion) for 8-9-years-old 
group (see Table 3). All arithmetic scores loaded highly on Factor 1, whereas all memory scores 
loaded highly on Factor 2. Two factors explaining 61% and 25% of the variance emerged for 10-11-
years-old children. All scores loaded highly in Factor 1, except for the γ coefficient for the memory 
task. Finally, two factors accounting for 60% and 23% of the variance emerged for 12-13-years-old 
children. φ and A’ROC indexes for both the arithmetic and the memory tasks loaded highly in Factor 1, 
while the two γ coefficients loaded highly in Factor 2. 
< Table 3 > 
Overall, the results of these correlational and factorial analyses provide support for the 
hypothesis that metacognitive abilities shift from domain-specific to domain-general during the 
course of childhood. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provided information about (a) children’s abilities to select and execute the 
better strategy in arithmetic and in memory, (b) the accuracy with which children predict whether 
they would select the better strategy, and (c) the developmental course of changes from domain-
specific to domain-general metacognition. 
Although findings regarding the two strategy selection tasks should be interpreted with 
cautions as evaluating one’s own performance for a task may modify how this task is performed, it is 
interesting to note that our results replicate improved strategy selection with age. Moreover, this 
experiment is the first to provide information on the speed with which children select the better 
strategy. In all previous studies, strategy selection times were not examined independently of 
strategy execution times, making it impossible to distinguish between these two processes. 
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Experiment 1 also showed that even 8-9-years-old children are able to make accurate 
metacognitive judgments during strategy selection in both the arithmetic and memory domains. We 
found above chance relations between rates of better strategy selection and EoS judgments across 
age groups, tasks, and multiple metacognitive measures. This indicates that children can introspect 
on their own strategy choices. 
Finally, our results are also the first to show that metacognition possibly shifts from domain-
specific to domain-general during childhood, as revealed by age-related differences in relations 
between metacognitive measures for each type of tasks. Specifically, it appears that this transition 
occurs between ages of 10 and 13 years. Data suggest that generalization of metacognition should 
not be viewed as occurring suddenly. Rather, gradual evolution is likely in the metacognitive system, 
with 10-11 year-old children being in a transition phase. Interestingly, this pattern was observed 
despite the finding that age-related changes in strategy selection differed in the arithmetic and 
memory domains (i.e., increased rates of better strategy selection in the arithmetic task, but not in 
the memory task), resulting in no correlations between measures of better strategy selection for the 
two tasks. If strategy selection is domain-specific at all ages, changes at the strategy selection level 
could not account for the developmental trend toward generalization that is observed at the 
metacognitive level. 
Experiment 2 
Metacognition is usually evaluated using two main types of judgments: prospective 
judgments, such as EoS, and retrospective judgments, such as RCJ. Previous studies have established 
that these two types of judgments are relatively independent from each other, even when they are 
made within the same cognitive domain (e.g., Kelemen et al., 2000; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005), 
suggesting that these judgments likely capture different aspects of metacognition. Consequently, if 
the developmental trajectory of the generalization of metacognition across domains depends on the 
type of judgments, these differences should be particularly pronounced between prospective and 
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retrospective judgments. Conversely, if the pattern of results for prospective judgments is replicated 
for retrospective judgments, it would further support the hypothesis of a developmental shift from 
domain-specific to domain-general metacognition. 
For this reason, the primary goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether the pattern of 
relations observed between prospective metacognitive judgments for the arithmetic and memory 
tasks in Experiment 1 could also be found using retrospective judgments. To test this, 8- to 13-years-
old children were recruited and asked to estimate on a trial-by-trial basis their level of confidence in 
a strategy once selected. 
Method 
Participants. A new sample of 60 typically developing children aged 8-9 (grade 5; n = 20; 10 
girls; mean age = 8.99 years; SD = 0.51), 10-11 (grade 6; n = 20; 10 girls; mean age = 10.98 years; 
SD = 0.52), and 12-13 (grade 7; n = 20; 9 females; mean age = 12.79 years; SD = 0.59) years was 
recruited. The native language of all children was French, and all children were from a middle- to 
upper-class socioeconomic status. One additional participant was tested but excluded from the final 
analyses because he selected the same strategy on all items in the arithmetic task. No group 
differences were found in levels parental education and in non-verbal intelligence, Fs<1. The sample 
was recruited from elementary and secondary schools in Belgium. 
Stimuli and procedure. Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. The procedure was also 
the same as in Experiment 1, except that we asked children to make RCJ instead of EoS judgments. 
Each stimulus of the arithmetic and the memory tasks went to three main phases that were 
presented in the following order: (a) the selection phase, (b) the judgment phase, and (c) the 
execution phase (see Figure 1). 
The selection phase was identical to that in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, however, this 
phase was immediately followed by a RCJ assessment during which children were instructed to 
indicate their level of confidence in the selected strategy. A thermometer procedure was used to 
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enable children to make their judgments. The position of the cursor on the horizontal thermometer 
was transformed into a RCJ percentage score (50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, and 100%). The lowest 
position on the thermometer indicated that children judged that the strategy was selected randomly. 
As participants had to select among two available strategies, they had at least a 50% chance to 
choose the better strategy. The judgment phase was followed by an execution phase that was similar 
to that in Experiment 1. 
Results 
We conducted the same analyses as in Experiment 1. Unless otherwise noted, differences are 
significant to at least p < .05. Preliminary analyses indicated no gender, order, or type of pairs’ effects 
on any of the dependent variables. Again, no outliers were found, all ps>.05. 
Age-related changes in strategic variations. Mean rates of better strategy selections, mean 
selection latencies, and mean execution times for the arithmetic and memory tasks were analyzed to 
test age-related and task-related differences in strategy selection and execution. We did not analyze 
mean rates of better strategy execution because most children made no execution errors. Rates of 
better strategy selection, mean strategy selection latencies, and mean strategy execution times were 
analyzed with mixed-design ANOVAs, 3 (Age: 8-9, 10-11, 12-13 year olds) x 2 (Task: arithmetic, 
memory), with age as the only between-participants factor (see means in Table 4). 
Better strategy selection rates. Rates of better strategy selection increased with children’s 
age, F(2,57) = 6.95, MSe = 1.36, η²p = .20. Planned comparisons showed that 8-9 year olds (.76) 
selected the better strategy less often than 10-11 year olds (.83), F(1,57) = 4.53, MSe = 1.16, η²p = 
.09, and than 12-13 year olds (.88), F(1,57) = 13.80, MSe = 1.16, η²p = .29. No differences were found 
between the two older groups, F = 2.52. All children also selected the better strategy more often in 
the memory task (.91) than in the arithmetic task (.74), F(1,57) = 52.23, MSe = 0.94, η²p = .48. The 
significant Age x Task interaction, F(2,57) = 4.46, MSe = 0.94, η²p = .14, resulted from age-related 
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increased rates of better strategy selection in the arithmetic task, F(2,57) = 7.34, MSe = 1.79, η²p = 
.20, and no age effects in the memory task, F = 1.06. 
< Table 4 > 
Better strategy selection latencies. Older children were faster to select the better strategy 
than younger children, F(2,57) = 15.35, MSe = 318536900, η²p = .35. Planned comparisons showed 
that 8-9 year olds (8500 ms) were slower to select the better strategy than 10-11 year olds (6472 
ms), F(1,57) = 14.72, MSe = 208645600, η²p = .23, and than 12-13 year olds (5656 ms), F(1,57) = 
28.95, MSe = 208645600, η²p = .38. No significant differences were found between the two older 
groups, F = 3.28. All children were faster to select the better strategy in the memory task (6278 ms) 
than in the arithmetic task (7476 ms), F(1,57) = 11.18, MSe = 219591800, η²p = .16. Finally, the Age x 
Task interaction came out significant, F(2,57) = 9.88, MSe = 219591800, η²p = .26. This interaction 
resulted from (a) significant differences in selection latencies between each group, Fs>5.35, in the 
arithmetic task, and (b) significant differences in latencies between the older group of children and 
each of the younger groups, Fs>4.02, and no difference between the two youngest group, F = 0.62, in 
the memory task. 
Better strategy execution times. Older children were faster to execute the better strategy 
than young children, F(2,57) = 7.17, MSe = 532931400, η²p = .20. Planned comparisons indicated that 
8-9 year olds (7067 ms) were slower to execute the better strategy than 10-11 year olds (4493 ms), 
F(1,57) = 14.17, MSe = 318161300, η²p = .29, and than 12-13 year olds (5541 ms), F(1,57) = 4.98, MSe 
= 318161300, η²p = .10. No differences were found between 10-11 year olds and 12-13 year olds, F = 
2.35. No other main or interaction effects reached significance, all Fs>1.02. 
Relations between domains. No correlations between the two types of tasks in better 
strategy selection rates and in better strategy selection latencies were significant for each age group, 
all rs<.26, all ps>.27. 
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In sum, like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 revealed that older children selected the better 
strategy more often than younger children, and that these age-related differences were only 
significant in the arithmetic task. Older children were faster to select and execute the better strategy 
than younger children in both tasks. All children were also faster to select the better strategy during 
the memory task than during the arithmetic task. Moreover, no correlations in strategy selections 
were found between the two domains, suggesting domain-specific strategy selection processes. 
Age-related changes in metacognitive processes. As in Experiment 1, we computed three 
measures of metacognitive sensitivity: φ, γ, and A’ROC. First, we examined whether the accuracy of 
children RCJ was statistically greater than chance. The t tests showed that each measure of 
metacognitive sensitivity was significantly above chance in the arithmetic task for all age groups and 
in the two older age groups in the memory task (see Table 5). 
To assess effects of age and of task, we analyzed children’s scores on each of the three 
metacognitive coefficients with mixed-design ANOVAs, with age as the only between-participants 
factor. Older children showed a trend toward a higher metacognitive sensitivity than younger 
children for the φ coefficients, F(2,57) = 2.94, MSe = 3.86, p = .061, η²p = .09. Specifically, 8-9 year 
olds had lower metacognitive sensitivity than 10-11 year olds, F(1,57) = 5.38, MSe = 2.38, and than 
12-13 year olds,  F(1,57) = 3.18, MSe = 2.38. No differences were found between the two older 
groups, F = 0.28. No other main or interaction effects reached significance, all Fs>2.24. 
< Table 5 > 
Domain-specificity/-generality of metacognition. To examine the developmental trajectory 
of the domain-specificity of metacognition, we first conducted Pearson’s correlation analyses 
between metacognitive measures across the arithmetic and memory domains for each age group. 
Correlational plots for each age group and each metacognitive measure are presented in the 
Appendix (Figure A2). None of the metacognitive values significantly correlated across domains for 8-
9-years-old children, rφ = -.17, p = .48, rγ = -.03, p = .87, rROC = -.01, p = .94. Significant correlations 
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were found between φ coefficients, r = .56, p = .011, γ coefficients, r = .45, p =.045, and A’ROC indexes, 
r = .62, p = .004, for 10-11 year olds. Similarly, φ coefficients, r = .45, p<.001, γ coefficients, r = .51, 
p<.001, and A’ROC indexes, r = .40, p = .002, significantly correlated for 12-13 year olds. We tested 
differences in these correlations with R-to-Z Fisher tests. Correlations between φ coefficients were 
smaller for 8-9 year olds than for 10-11 year olds (rs = -.17 vs. .56, p = .012) and than for 12-13 year 
olds (rs = -.17 vs. .73, p = .001). Correlations between γ coefficients were larger for 12-13 year olds 
than for 8-9 year olds (rs = -.04 vs. .87, p<.001) and than for 10-11 year olds (rs = .45 vs. .87, p = .009). 
Finally, correlations between A’ROC indexes were smaller for 8-9 year olds than for 10-11 year olds (rs 
= -.02 vs. .62, p = .018) and than for 12-13 year olds (rs = -.02 vs. .60, p = .022). No other age 
differences were found in these correlations, all ps>.13.  
Next, we conducted canonical correlation analyses for each age group. Results showed no 
significant relations between measures for 8-9-years-old group, r = .51, χ²(9) = 5.30, p = .81. The sets 
of metacognitive measures for the arithmetic and the memory tasks correlated for 10-11-years-old 
group, r = .70, χ²(9) = 20.01, p = .017, and 12-13-years-old group, r = .90, χ²(9) = 32.94, p<.001. 
To rule out the possibility that our patterns of results were due to the fact that older children 
had more stable response bias scores across tasks as compared to young children, we conducted 
Pearson’s correlation analyses between RCJs for both tasks in each age group. Data indicated that 
absolute RCJs were significantly correlated in each age group, r = .42, p = .04 at age 8-9, r = .40, p = 
.05 at age 10-11, and r = .48, p = .03 at age 12-13. None of the R-to-Z Fisher tests conducted to 
examine differences between these correlations were significant, all ps > .38. This suggests that there 
are no age-related differences in the correlations between RCJs in the arithmetic and in the memory 
tasks.  
Finally, like in Experiment 1, to further investigate whether our six measures of 
metacognitive sensitivity started to cluster independently of the domain in a specific age group, we 
conducted EFAs for each age group. Factor loadings are presented in Table 6. Two factors accounting 
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for 51% and 39% of the variance emerged with an eigenvalue exceeding 1 for 8-9 year olds. All 
arithmetic scores loaded highly on Factor 1, whereas all memory scores loaded highly on Factor 2. 
Two factors explaining 65% and 18% of the variance emerged for 10-11 year olds. All scores loaded 
highly in Factor 1. Finally, only one factor accounting for 77% of the variance emerged with an 
eigenvalue exceeding 1 for 12-13 year olds, indicating that the metacognitive variables of both the 
arithmetic and memory domains clustered together. 
< Table 6 > 
Overall, these findings are consistent with the conclusion that children’s metacognitive 
abilities first segregate by content domain, at least until the age of 8-9 years, but are no more 
bounded to specific domains by the age of 12-13 years. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1, indicating that children are capable of 
uncertainty monitoring for strategy selection task in two different cognitive domains. Furthermore, 
correlation analyses showed significant relations between strategy selection accuracy and RCJ for 10-
11 year olds and 12-13 year olds, but not for 8-9 year olds, which was confirmed by the results of the 
canonical correlations and the EFAs. This suggests that change from domain-specific to domain-
general metacognition also occurs when children make retrospective metacognitive judgments. As in 
Experiment 1, this pattern is observed despite the fact that children’s strategy selection performance 
seems to involve domain-specific processes and distinct developmental paths. 
 The main difference between Experiments 1 and 2 is the lack of age-related differences in 
metacognitive sensitivity for strategy selection. This is consistent with findings in the developmental 
literature indicating that the effects of age on metacognitive sensitivity are usually smaller for 
retrospective judgments than for prospective judgments (Schneider & Lockl, 2008). The fact that two 
metacognitive judgments with different developmental trajectories show similar change from 
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domain-specific to domain-general metacognitive mechanisms provides evidence for the robustness 
of our findings. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the rates of better strategy selection were higher in the memory task 
than in the arithmetic task, indicating that these two tasks were not of equal difficulty. Moreover, 
ceiling effects were revealed for the memory task in both Experiments 1 and 2. As task difficulty has 
been shown to influence participants’ metacognitive judgments (Schraw & Roedel, 1994), this could 
potentially account for the metacognitive differences observed between age groups in our two 
experiments. For this reason, the aim of Experiment 3 was to replicate Experiment 2, but this time in 
reducing differences in tasks difficulty. 
Method 
Participants. A new sample of 72 typically developing children aged 8-9 (grade 5; n = 24; 13 
girls; mean age = 9.25 years; SD = 0.48), 10-11 (grade 6; n = 24; 13 girls; mean age = 11.19 years; 
SD = 0.43), and 12-13 (grade 7; n = 24; 16 girls; mean age = 12.79 years; SD = 0.60) years was 
recruited. The native language of all children was French, and all children were from a middle- to 
upper-class socioeconomic status. No group differences were found in levels parental education and 
in non-verbal intelligence, Fs<1. The sample was recruited from elementary and middle schools in 
Belgium. 
Stimuli and procedure. Stimuli were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, except that both 
the arithmetic and the memory tasks included 32 stimuli instead of 40. The stimuli were selected so 
as to reduce differences in tasks difficulty. In the arithmetic task, we included the 32 problems to 
which children responded the most correctly in Experiments 1 and 2. In the memory task, we 
selected the 32 triads to which children responded the least correctly in the two previous 
experiments. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2. Each stimulus of the arithmetic and 
memory tasks went to three main phases that were presented in the following order: (a) the 
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selection phase, (b) the judgment phase, and (c) the execution phase (see Figure 1). In the judgment 
phase, we asked children to make RCJ. 
Results 
We conducted the same analyses as in Experiments 1 and 2. Unless otherwise noted, 
differences are significant to at least p<.05. Preliminary analyses indicated no gender, order, or type 
of pairs’ effects on any of the dependent variables. Also, no outliers were found, all ps>.17 
Age-related changes in strategic variations. Mean rates of better strategy selections, mean 
selection latencies, and mean execution times for the arithmetic and the memory tasks were 
analyzed to test age-related and task-related differences in strategy selection and execution. We did 
not analyze mean rates of better strategy execution because most children made no execution 
errors. Rates of better strategy selection, mean strategy selection latencies, and mean strategy 
execution times were analyzed with mixed-design ANOVAs, 3 (Age: 8-9, 10-11, 12-13 year olds) x 2 
(Task: arithmetic, memory), with age as the only between-participants factor (see means in Table 7). 
Better strategy selection rates. Rates of better strategy selection increased with children’s 
age, F(2,69) = 6.72, MSe = 0.29, η²p = .16. Planned comparisons showed that 8-9 year olds (.84) 
selected the better strategy less often than 12-13 year olds (.89), F(1,69) = 12.98, MSe = 0.29, η²p = 
.26. No other differences were found between groups, Fs<2.44, ps>.09. No other effects reached 
significance, all Fs<1. 
< Table 7 > 
Better strategy selection latencies. Older children were faster at selecting the better strategy 
than younger children, F(2,69) = 5.82, MSe = 270900300, η²p = .14. Planned comparisons showed that 
8-9 year olds (6346 ms) were slower at selecting the better strategy than 10-11 year olds (5547 ms), 
F(1,69) = 3.91, MSe = 270900278, η²p = .08, and than 12-13 year olds (4972 ms), F(1,69) = 11.53, MSe 
= 270900278, η²p = .20. No significant differences were found between the two older groups, F = 
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2.02. All children were faster at selecting the better strategy for the memory task (4701 ms) than for 
the arithmetic task (6543 ms), F(1,69) = 37.02, MSe = 227617800, η²p = .35. The Age x Task 
interaction was not significant, F<1.. 
Better strategy execution times. Older children were faster at executing the better strategy 
than young children, F(2,69) = 10.41, MSe = 408859900, η²p = .23. Planned comparisons indicated 
that 8-9 year olds (6742 ms) were slower at executing the better strategy than 10-11 year olds (5269 
ms), F(1,69) = 8.78, MSe = 408859878, η²p = .14, and than 12-13 year olds (4512 ms), F(1,69) = 20.13, 
MSe = 408859878, η²p = .33. No differences were found between 10-11 year olds and 12-13 year 
olds, F = 2.32, p = .13. No other main or interaction effects reached significance, all Fs<1. 
Relations between strategic domains. No correlations between better strategy selection rates 
and better strategy selection latencies for the two types of tasks for each age group were significant, 
all rs<.26, all ps>.21. 
In sum, Experiment 3 revealed that older children select the better strategy more often than 
younger children. The lack of significant Age x Task interaction suggests that our manipulation to 
reduce differences in tasks difficulty was successful. As in Experiments 1 and 2, older children were 
faster to select and execute the better strategy than younger children in both tasks. All children were 
also faster to select the better strategy during the memory task than during the arithmetic task. 
Although differences in task difficulty were reduced in the present experiment, no correlations in 
strategy selections were found between the two domains, confirming domain-specific strategy 
selection processes. 
Age-related changes in metacognitive processes. We computed three measures of 
metacognitive sensitivity: φ, γ, and A’ROC. First, we examined whether the accuracy of children RCJ 
was statistically greater than chance. The t tests showed that each measure of metacognitive 
sensitivity was significantly above chance in both the arithmetic and the memory tasks for all age 
groups (see Table 8). 
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To assess age and task effects, we analyzed children’s scores on each of the three 
metacognitive coefficients with mixed-design ANOVAs, with age as the only between-participants 
factor. Older children showed a higher metacognitive sensitivity than younger children for A’ROC 
coefficients, F(2,69) = 3.15, MSe = 1.95, η²p = .08, and a trend toward a higher metacognitive 
sensitivity for the φ coefficients, F(2,69) = 2.81, MSe = 5.60, p = .066, η²p = .08. Specifically, 8-9 year 
olds had lower metacognitive sensitivity than 12-13 year olds, for both the A’ROC, F(1,69) = 6.29, 
MSe = 1.94, and the φ, F(1,69) = 5.02, MSe = 5.61. No other differences between groups were found, 
Fs<3.21. No other main or interaction effects reached significance, all Fs<1.98. 
< Table 8 > 
Domain-specificity/-generality of metacognition. To examine the developmental trajectory 
of the domain-specificity of metacognition, we first conducted Pearson’s correlation analyses 
between metacognitive measures across the arithmetic and memory domains for each age group. 
Correlational plots for each age group and each metacognitive measure are presented in the 
Appendix (Figure A3). None of the metacognitive values significantly correlated across domains in 8-
9-years-old children, rφ = .11, p = .62, rγ = .16, p = .45, rROC = .26, p = .21. However, significant 
correlations were found between φ coefficients, r = .50, p = .013, γ coefficients, r = .46, p =.025, and 
A’ROC indexes, r = .64, p = .001, in 10-11 year olds. Similarly, φ coefficients, r = .81, p<.001, γ 
coefficients, r = .63, p = .001, and A’ROC indexes, r = .78, p<.001, significantly correlated in 12-13 year 
olds. We tested differences between these correlations with R-to-Z Fisher tests. Correlations 
between φ coefficients were smaller for 8-9 year olds than for 12-13 year olds (rs = .11 vs. .81, p = 
.002). Correlations between γ coefficients were larger in 12-13 year olds than in 8-9 year olds (rs = 
.16 vs. .63, p = .047). Finally, correlations between A’ROC indexes were smaller in 8-9 year olds than in 
12-13 year olds (rs = .26 vs. .78, p = .015). No other age differences were found in these correlations, 
all ps>.11.  
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Next, we conducted canonical correlation analyses for each age group. Results showed no 
significant relations between measures in 8-9 years olds, r = .53, χ²(9) = 9.11, p = .43, but the sets of 
metacognitive measures for the arithmetic and memory tasks correlated in 10-11 years olds, r = .85, 
χ²(9) = 31.92, p<.001, and in 12-13 years olds, r = .86, χ²(9) = 31.86, p<.001. 
We also conducted Pearson’s correlation analyses between RCJs for both tasks in each age 
group. Results indicated that RCJs of both tasks were significantly correlated in each age group, r = 
.42, p = .02 at age 8-9, r = .34, p = .04 at age 10-11, and r = .41, p = .02 at age 12-13. None of the R-to-
Z Fisher tests conducted to examine differences between these correlations were significant, all ps > 
.38. Overall, these findings suggest that the developmental changes observed across domains in the 
metacognitive indexes were not due to age-related differences in children’s response bias scores, but 
to differences in their abilities to discriminate between better or poorer strategy selections.  
To further investigate whether our six measures of metacognitive sensitivity started to 
cluster independently of the domain in a specific age group, we conducted EFAs for each age group. 
(see factor loadings in Table 9). Two factors accounting for 53% and 37% of the variance emerged 
with an eigenvalue exceeding 1 for 8-9 year olds. All arithmetic scores loaded highly on Factor 1, 
whereas all memory scores loaded highly on Factor 2. Two factors explaining 61% and 20% of the 
variance emerged for 10-11 year olds. All scores loaded highly on Factor 1. Finally, only one factor 
accounting for 80% of the variance emerged with an eigenvalue exceeding 1 for 12-13 year olds, 
indicating that the metacognitive variables of both the arithmetic and the memory domains 
clustered together. 
Finally, to ensure that the nonsignificant correlation in the youngest age group was not due 
to a lack of statistical power, we combined data from Experiments 2 and 3 and conducted Pearson’s 
correlation analyses between our different metacognitive scores. When the influence of strategy 
selection rates (which differed in these two experiments) was taken into account, none of the 
metacognitive values significantly correlated across domains in 8-9-years-old children, rφ = .12, p = 
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.46, rγ = .07, p = .64, rROC = .17, p = .26. Moreover, the correlations were still significant for all 
metacognitive indexes in the older two groups, all rs > .59, all ps < .005. We also conducted 
regression analyses on this larger sample in order to determine whether the relations between our 
metacognitive scores across domains interact with children’s age (in years). Results confirmed that 
the relations between our three metacognitive measures for the arithmetic and the memory tasks 
increased with age, βφ = 2.78, p < 0.01, βγ = 2.34, p < .001, βROC = 2.83, p < .001. 
< Table 9 > 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting that children are 
capable of uncertainty monitoring for strategy selection tasks in two different domains. Our findings 
also confirm that children’s metacognitive abilities first segregate by content domain, at least before 
the age of 10-11 years, but are no more bounded to domain by the age of 12-13 years. Importantly, 
this pattern was observed while no differences were found in the rates of better strategy selection 
between the arithmetic and memory tasks. Combined with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, 
Experiment 3 provides evidence that age-related differences observed in metacognitive sensitivity is 
likely not due to differences in task difficulty. 
General Discussion 
Adult metacognition is generally considered as involving domain-general processes that are 
not bounded to a particular cognitive domain (e.g., Schraw et al., 1995; Song et al., 2011; Veenman 
et al., 1997). Conversely, studies carried out in children seem to show that metacognition is domain-
specific in the early stage of development (e.g., Vo et al., 2014). These diverging results suggest that 
a development from domain-specific to domain-general occurs in metacognitive abilities between 
childhood and adulthood. Up until now, however, the exact developmental course of this transition 
was still unexplored. The present study contributed to this issue by examining the relations between 
different measures of metacognitive sensitivity in an arithmetic and a memory strategy selection 
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tasks. Moreover, we also tested how accurate children were to evaluate the success of strategy 
selection processes. The present findings have important implications to further our understanding 
of age-related changes in metacognition as it is involved in strategy selection. We next discuss these 
implications. 
Domain-General or Domain-Specific Metacognitive Processes? 
The results of Experiments 1—3 consistently indicated that a gradual shift toward domain-
general metacognition occurs in children aged between 8 and 13, providing first evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that metacognition is first domain-specific, and then generalizes across domains as 
children mature (Schraw et al., 1995; Veenman & Spaans, 2005). These findings are important 
because they provide key information to improve our understanding of the architecture of 
metacognition. 
The popular dual-process framework of metacognition (e.g., Koriat, 2007; Koriat & 
Ackerman, 2010; Koriat, Nussinson, Bless, & Shaked, 2008; Stanovich & West, 2000; Thompson, 
Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011) could provide an interesting framework for interpreting our 
results. According to this model, two mechanisms come into play when people have to distinguish 
what they know from what they do not know. On the one hand, metacognitive judgments can be 
experience-based. This is based on fast and automatic inferences made from a variety of cues (e.g., 
degree of perceptual detail, processing fluency) that are heuristically used to guide decisions. As 
experience-based judgments rest on cues that reside from the immediate feedback from the task; 
they are task-dependent and, thus, probably difficult to generalize across domains. On the other 
hand, metacognitive judgments can also be information-based. These include conscious and 
deliberate inferences, in which various pieces of information retrieved from memory are consulted 
and weighted in order to reach an educated judgment (Koriat, 2007). As information-based processes 
are conscious and effortful, they are probably more likely to be generalized to other domains than 
experience-based processes (Pasquali, Timmermans, & Cleeremans, 2010). 
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Within this framework, the finding that metacognition is domain-specific under the age of 10 
years could suggest that young children preferentially rely on automatic inferences when making 
judgments. This assumption is consistent with the results of recent studies conducted in the memory 
field, indicating that some mnemonic cues are already used heuristically to guide metacognitive 
decisions as early as age 4 (see Geurten & Willems, 2016, for an overview). With age, however, 
effortful cognitive abilities (see Best & Miller, 2011, for a review) and explicit metacognitive 
knowledge (Geurten, Catale, & Meulemans, 2016) improve. This may enable children to rely more 
often on conscious and deliberate information-based processes based on general knowledge 
structure when judging their performance, possibly explaining why metacognition shifts from 
domain-specific to domain-general during late childhood. 
Interestingly, the finding that metacognition is domain-specific before being domain-general 
could also explain why, although some imaging studies reveal that inter-domain measures of 
metacognitive sensitivity share some neural substrates (e.g., Allen et al., 2016), others indicate that 
metacognition is sustained by distinct cortical networks (e.g., Baird et al., 2013). It could also explain 
why adult patients with brain lesions can show domain-specific impairments of metacognition 
(Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014). Indeed, if metacognitive skills first develop within 
domain before generalizing across domains, it is likely that these skills involved distinct neuro-
anatomic regions in addition to common ones (as it is the case for executive functions, Collette et al., 
2005). Moreover, according to the dual-processes framework, experience-based (probably more 
domain-specific) and information-based (probably more domain-general) processes can be activated 
in parallel during the same task. The predominance of one of these processes over the other depends 
on the context, the task, and the available cognitive resources (Koriat et al., 2008). In other words, it 
is possible that metacognition remains characterized by both specificity and generality of processes, 
even in adulthood. Domain-specific aspects could thus be differentially affected by neurological 
insult (Fleming et al., 2014). This hypothesis, however, has to be further examined, just as our results 
have to be confirmed by examining intra-individual changes in domain-general metacognition over 
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time. Indeed, the interpretation of our data within the dual-process framework is still mostly 
speculative since our study was not designed to test this model. 
Consistent with previous findings, the sensitivity of prospective judgments greatly increased 
with age while improvements in retrospective judgments were less substantial, probably explaining 
why only one or two of our three metacognitive measures were able to capture age-related 
improvements in RCJ sensitivity in Experiments 2 (phi coefficient) and 3 (phi and A’ROC coefficient). 
The higher variability of the gamma coefficient probably explains why this index was not able to 
discriminate between our three age groups in these two experiments. It is interesting to note that 
differences in the developmental trajectory of prospective and retrospective judgments do not seem 
to affect the generalization of metacognitive processes across domains. Domain-general 
metacognition seems to appear approximately at the same age for both types of judgments. This 
suggests that the development of domain-general metacognition does not depend on changes in the 
absolute level of metacognitive sensitivity, but rather on changes in processes underlying how 
metacognitive judgments are made. 
Metacognition and Strategy Selection 
The present results replicate previous findings on strategic behaviors and age-related 
improvements in how children select and execute strategies for both the arithmetic and the memory 
tasks. They also document new findings that shed important light on how participants evaluate their 
strategy selection. Specifically, our results examining the sensitivity of children’s metacognitive 
judgments indicate that children from 8 to 13 years are able to accurately estimate whether they 
select the better strategy on a given item in both the arithmetic and the memory domains. 
Furthermore, metacognitive sensitivity for strategy selection seems to increase with age. 
From a theoretical perspective, the finding that metacognitive sensitivity for strategy 
selection tasks improves with age in both the arithmetic and the memory domains provides a first 
and crucial prerequisite to validate the hypothesis that metacognitive skills can account for age-
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related differences in children’s strategy selection and execution (e.g., Lemaire & Lecacheur, 2011). 
Indeed, according to classical models of metacognition (Nelson & Narens, 1990), making accurate 
evaluations of the success of cognitive processes is supposed to increase the likelihood that 
participants implement effective regulatory behaviors. Consistent with this view, in the arithmetic 
domain, two of the computational models of strategies (RCCL and SCADS*) assume that strategy 
choices involve metacognitive mechanisms. In these models, the metacognitive system enables 
participants to evaluate strategies once selected and to interrupt strategy mid-execution to switch 
for a better strategy (RCCL) or to discover new legitimate strategies (SCADS*). Although future 
studies should, of course, be conducted to experimentally test these proposals – e.g., by examining 
whether children use the results of their metacognitive evaluation to regulate their strategic 
behaviors – our findings provide a first important step toward the corroboration of these theoretical 
postulates. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The present study raises a number of interesting issues that some future studies may 
fruitfully address. First, our study examined whether children’s ability to monitor their cognitive 
performance shifted from domain-specific to domain-general. However, we did not explore whether 
participants’ ability to regulate their performance followed the same developmental path. As the 
developmental course of metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control differs in children (see 
Schneider & Lockl, 2008), it is possible that domain-general metacognition does not emerge at the 
same time for these two metacognitive components. 
Also, although our findings provide crucial information about how metacognition develops 
throughout childhood, they remain cross-sectional in nature. Yet, only within-individual data 
collected over time could help to decide whether age-related differences in the relations between 
metacognitive measures across domains are due to transition from domain-specific to domain-
general abilities or to the emergence of a domain-general metacognition independent from domain-
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specific metacognitive processes. Another important outstanding issue concerns the mechanisms 
that underline this developmental path. We assume here that the emergence of information-based 
metacognition may account for age-related differences observed in relations between metacognitive 
measures across domains, but this hypothesis remains to be formally tested. Finally, the number of 
participants recruited in our first two experiments was rather small. In this context, it is possible that 
our studies were not powerful enough to reveal relations between arithmetic and memory measures 
of metacognition in young children. Although our third experiment had more power and showed 
similar results, we cannot totally rule out the hypothesis that there is an embryonic domain-general 
metacognition in young children that increases with age. 
Despite these limitations, the results of the present study seem to indicate that 
metacognition is no more bounded by task content and domain knowledge after the age of 10. We 
also found that the metacognitive sensitivity for strategy selection improves with age in both the 
arithmetic and memory domains. These findings suggest that, at around 10-11 years (or later), a 
domain-general metacognition begins to operate. This is particularly important for children who 
suffer from learning disabilities in a specific cognitive sphere (e.g., dyscalculia, dyslexia) because it 
means that training them to make accurate metacognitive judgments in one domain could 
potentially improve their metacognitive sensitivity in other domains, including the impaired one. This 
is an interesting prediction that future studies can test directly by assessing children with cognitive 
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Mean Better Strategy Selection Rates, Mean Selection Times (in ms), and Mean Execution Times (in 
ms) in Each Age Group for the Arithmetic and the Memory Tasks, in Experiment 1. 
 8-9 year olds 10-11 year olds 12-13 year olds Means 
Arithmetic 
Better strategy selection rates 0.64 (.04) 0.79 (.04) 0.80 (.03) 0.74 (.03) 
Better strategy selection times 6349 (708) 6127 (430) 5338 (470) 5938 (413) 
Better strategy execution times 7243 (474) 6066 (414) 6784 (463) 6698 (264) 
Memory 
Better strategy  selection rates 0.91 (.01) 0.93 (.01) 0.92 (.01) 0.92 (.01) 
Better strategy selection times 5606 (672) 4520 (485) 3202 (250) 4442 (318) 
Better strategy execution times 5942 (649) 5103 (553) 6438 (660) 5828 (369) 




Means and Tests of Metacognitive Sensitivity for the Three Age Groups and the Two Strategy 
Selection Tasks, in Experiment 1 
 φ γ A’ROC 
M t M t M t 
Arithmetic 
8-9 year olds .10 (.03) 2.87* .31 (.09) 3.55* .55 (.02) 2.58* 
10-11 year olds .18 (.04) 3.92** .60 (.12) 4.28** .55 (.02) 3.47* 
12-13 year olds .32 (.03) 8.57** .71 (.06) 11.87** .64 (.02) 6.73** 
All .21 (.02) 8.77** .50 (.06) 8.78** .59 (.01) 7.72** 
Memory 
8-9 year olds .16 (.05) 2.64* .37 (.14) 2.12* .56 (.02) 3.13* 
10-11 year olds .20 (.06) 5.58** .47 (.17) 3.92** .58 (.02) 5.16** 
12-13 year olds .31 (.02) 14.30** .90 (.02) 37.26** .60 (.01) 10.48** 
All .22 (.03) 7.93** .62 (.08) 7.91** .57 (.01) 7.84** 
Note. t tests are two-tailed comparisons against chance: i.e., 0 for φ and γ; 0.5 for Area under the 






Loadings of each Metacognitive Measures on the two Strategy Selection Tasks for Each Age Group, in 
Experiment 1 
 8-9 years 10-11 years 12-13 years 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Arithmetic 
φ .11 .98 .83 -.52 .92 .28 
γ .01 .90 .71 -.45 .46 .75 
A’ROC .08 .94 .78 -.48 .95 .01 
Memory 
φ .99 .06 .87 .46 .84 .05 
γ .92 .08 .63 .69 -.25 .83 
A’ROC .93 .05 .84 .34 .92 -.24 
Eigenvalue 2.73 2.67 3.67 1.52 3.61 1.35 
%Variance Explained 46 45 61 25 60 23 





Mean Better Strategy Selection Rates, Mean Selection Times (in ms), and Mean Execution Times (in 
ms) in Each Age Group for the Arithmetic and the Memory Tasks, in Experiment 2. 
 8-9 year olds 10-11 year olds 12-13 year olds Means 
Arithmetic 
Better strategy selection rates 0.63 (.03) 0.76 (.03) 0.85 (.03) .74 (.03) 
Better strategy selection times 8199 (371) 6985 (380) 7742 (398) 7642 (320) 
Better strategy execution times 7325 (524) 4574 (576) 5287 (582) 5729 (558) 
Memory 
Better strategy selection rates 0.89 (.02) 0.91 (.02) 0.93 (.01) 0.91 (.01) 
Better strategy selection times 8802 (607) 6009 (467) 4021 (336) 6278 (429) 
Better strategy execution times 6809 (506) 4412 (554) 5795 (599) 5672 (523) 




Means and Tests of Metacognitive Sensitivity for the Three Age Groups and the Two Strategy 
Selection Tasks, in Experiment 2 
 φ γ A’ROC 
M t M t M t 
Arithmetic 
8-9 year olds .09 (.03) 2.47* .20 (.08) 2.42* .54 (.02) 2.64* 
10-11 year olds .23 (.05) 4.52** .42 (.14) 2.97* .62 (.03) 3.62* 
12-13 year olds .17 (.04) 3.74** .38 (.14) 2.69* .57 (.02) 3.42* 
All .16 (.03) 6.16** .34 (.07) 4.63** .57 (.01) 5.30** 
Memory 
8-9 year olds .10 (.05) 1.94† .24 (.17) 1.43 .56 (.03) 1.93† 
10-11 year olds .23 (.05) 4.64** .55 (.14) 3.94** .58 (.03) 2.97* 
12-13 year olds .23 (.06) 3.92** .43 (.18) 2.43* .61 (.03) 2.91* 
All .19 (.03) 5.94** .41 (.09) 4.36** .58 (.02) 4.49** 
Note. t tests are two-tailed comparisons against chance: i.e., 0 for φ and γ; 0.5 for Area under the 
Receiver-Operating-Characteristic (ROC) curve (A’ROC). Standard errors are in parentheses. 





Loadings of each Metacognitive Measure on the two Strategy Selection Tasks for Each Age Group, in 
Experiment 2 
 8-9 years 10-11 years 12-13 years 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 
Arithmetic 
φ .89 -.42 -.89 .42 -.93 
γ .89 -.43 -.77 .40 -.87 
A’ROC .88 -.40 -.84 .39 -.90 
Memory 
φ -.57 -.78 -.85 -.48 -.91 
γ -.43 -.76 -.63 -.52 -.91 
A’ROC -.42 -.79 -.83 -.33 -.76 
Eigenvalue 3.06 2.35 3.89 1.10 4.65 
%Variance Explained 51 39 65 18 77 





Mean Better Strategy Selection Rates, Mean Selection Times (in ms), and Mean Execution Times (in 
ms) in Each Age Group for the Arithmetic and the Memory Tasks, in Experiment 3. 
 8-9 year olds 10-11 year olds 12-13 year olds Means 
Arithmetic 
Better strategy selection rates 0.83 (.01) 0.88 (.01) 0.90 (.01) 0.87 (.61) 
Better strategy selection times 7070 (369) 6502 (415) 6055 (370) 6543 (225) 
Better strategy execution times 6914 (615) 5150 (571) 4599 (354) 5554 (321) 
Memory 
Better strategy selection rates 0.86 (.02) 0.87 (.01) 0.88 (.01) 0.87 (.01) 
Better strategy selection times 5621 (422) 4592 (313) 3889 (427) 4701 (238) 
Better strategy execution times 6570 (417) 5388 (441) 4426 (388) 5461 (258) 




Means and Tests of Metacognitive Sensitivity for the Three Age Groups and the Two Strategy 
Selection Tasks, in Experiment 3 
 φ γ A’ROC 
M t M t M t 
Arithmetic 
8-9 year olds .25 (.06) 4.33** .35 (.09) 2.49* .60 (.03) 3.83** 
10-11 year olds .23 (.04) 6.48** .28 (.08) 1.89* .62 (.02) 6.25** 
12-13 year olds .39 (.05) 7.23** .45 (.09) 3.59* .70 (.03) 5.64** 
All .29 (.03) 9.79** .36 (.05) 4.59** .64 (.02) 8.45** 
Memory 
8-9 year olds .24 (.05) 5.24** .39 (.08) 3.24* .58 (.02) 3.83** 
10-11 year olds .31 (.06) 5.33** .46 (.08) 4.06** .66 (.03) 4.60** 
12-13 year olds .37 (.04) 8.48** .42 (.11) 2.63* .66 (.03) 5.62** 
All .31 (.03) 10.59** .43 (.05) 5.64** .63 (.02) 7.93** 
Note. t tests are two-tailed comparisons against chance: i.e., 0 for φ and γ; 0.5 for Area under the 






Loadings of each Metacognitive Measure on the two Strategy Selection Tasks for Each Age Group, in 
Experiment 3 
 8-9 years 10-11 years 12-13 years 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 
Arithmetic 
φ -.76 .62 -.90 .17 -.91 
γ -.70 .55 -.92 .14 -.87 
A’ROC -.78 .49 -.71 .47 -.95 
Memory 
φ -.58 -.68 -.70 -.61 -.94 
γ -.57 -.77 -.64 -.62 -.83 
A’ROC -.53 -.68 -.87 .24 -.84 
Eigenvalue 3.19 2.25 3.69 1.19 4.77 
%Variance Explained 53 37 61 20 80 





Figure 1. Detail of the experimental procedure for the arithmetic task (Panel A) and the memory task 
(Panel B), in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. Ease of Selection (EoS) judgments are required only in 
















Figure A3. Correlational plots between the phi, the gamma, and the A’ROC indexes for the three age groups in Experiment 3. 
 
